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Abstract
This article investigates and empirically tests the link between climate change and
sovereign risk in Southeast Asia. Southeast Asian countries are among those most
heavily affected by climate change. The number and intensity of extreme weather
events in the region have been increasing markedly, causing severe social and eco-
nomic damage. Southeast Asian economies are also exposed to gradual effects of
global warming as well as transition risks stemming from policies aimed at mitigating
climate change. To empirically examine the effect of climate change on the sovereign
risk of Southeast Asian countries, we employ indices for vulnerability and resilience
to climate change and estimate country-specific OLS models for six countries and a
fixed effects panel using monthly data for the period 2002–2018. Both the country-
specific and the panel results show that greater climate vulnerability appears to have
a sizable positive effect on sovereign bond yields, while greater resilience to climate
change has an offsetting effect, albeit to a lesser extent. A higher cost of debt holds
back much-needed investment in public infrastructure and climate adaptation,
increases the risk of debt sustainability problems, and diminishes the development
prospects of Southeast Asian countries.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Southeast Asian countries are among those most heavily affected by
climate change. The number and intensity of extreme weather events
in the region have been increasing markedly, often leading to the loss
of life, homes, and livelihoods and causing severe economic damage.
Southeast Asian economies are also exposed to gradual effects of
global warming as well as transition risks stemming from policies
aimed at mitigating climate change, the development of more climate-
friendly technologies, and changes in consumer preferences.
To date, there is still very little analysis on the impacts of climate
change on financial and macroeconomic stability in Southeast Asian
countries. Moreover, there has been no systematic analysis thus far
on the nexus between climate change and sovereign risk in Southeast
Asia, even though it has become increasingly clear that the macroeco-
nomic impacts of climate change and hence also the implications for
public finances, will be substantial in this region. Understanding the
implications of climate change for sovereign risk is of crucial impor-
tance at the current juncture as urgent action is needed to better miti-
gate and manage associated risks and climate-proof public finances,
which are already under considerable strain due to the COVID-19
pandemic. Indeed, the pandemic has highlighted the pressing need to
build resilience into our social, economic, and financial systems, and
strong and sustainable public finances are crucial for this.
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Against this backdrop, this article discusses the macrofinancial
and sovereign risks stemming from climate change for Southeast
Asian countries. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first
to examine climate change dynamics and fiscal transmission channels
in Southeast Asian economies with an empirical focus on country-
specific implications. To empirically examine the effect of climate
change on the sovereign risk of the member countries of the Associa-
tion of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),1 we estimate country-
specific OLS models and a fixed effects panel over the period
2002M1 to 2018M12, using indices for climate change vulnerability
and resilience to climate change. The country-specific models are esti-
mated for six ASEAN countries: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam. The results indicate that greater
vulnerability to climate change has a sizable positive effect on sover-
eign bond yields, while greater resilience to climate change has an off-
setting effect. The climate change risk premium is the highest for Viet
Nam, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand. The effect of resilience
to risks from climate change has a substantially lower effect on bond
yields across all ASEAN economies in our sample.
Our findings indicate that those ASEAN countries that are partic-
ularly exposed to climate change and have the greatest need to scale
up resilience investment face the highest climate change risk premium
on their sovereign debt. An increase in sovereign risk worsens the
financing conditions of countries and can weaken their development
prospects as it constrains fiscal space for investment, not only in cru-
cial areas such as health and education, but also in adaptation mea-
sures which are urgently needed to cope with the effects of climate
change. With climate change accelerating, and both physical and tran-
sition impacts becoming ever more pronounced, climate-related risk
premia on sovereign bonds are bound to increase further for climate
vulnerable countries, undermining debt sustainability and much-
needed investment in resilience.
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the nexus
between climate change and sovereign risk. Section 3 provides an
overview of climate impacts on the Southeast Asian economies and
how these may affect sovereign risk. Section 4 presents an empirical
analysis of the impact of vulnerability and resilience to climate change
on the sovereign bond yields of Southeast Asian countries. Section 5
concludes by discussing the implications of this research for the
development prospects of Southeast Asian countries and policy mea-
sures that could be taken to address the problem.
2 | CLIMATE CHANGE AND
SOVEREIGN RISK
Testing the relationship between climate change and sovereign risk is
a relatively new strand of the literature, with recent empirical work
demonstrating that vulnerability and resilience to climate change are
important factors driving the cost of sovereign borrowing at the global
level (Beirne, Renzhi, & Volz, 2020; Kling, Lo, Murinde, & Volz, 2018).2
Conceptually, climate change can impact on an economy and public
finances—and thus debt sustainability—in several ways (Volz
et al., 2020).3 In particular, climate-related natural disasters may have
direct fiscal impacts. Government finances and a country's debt sus-
tainability are exposed to different fiscal risks related to natural disas-
ters. The IMF classifies fiscal risk into two categories, namely
macroeconomic risks and specific fiscal risks, which may “arise from
the realization of contingent liabilities or other uncertain events, such
as a natural disaster, the bailout of a troubled public corporation or
subnational government by the central government, or the collapse of
a bank” (IMF, 2018, p. 95). Macroeconomic risks related to natural
disasters and extreme weather include risks of a disruption of eco-
nomic activity, which may adversely affect tax income and other pub-
lic revenues and increase social transfer payments (e.g., Schuler,
Oliveira, Mele, & Antonio, 2019); changes to commodity prices that
could affect revenue or increase spending via fossil fuel or food subsi-
dies; effects on inflation and interest rates through supply or demand
shocks; and exchange rate effects (e.g., Farhi & Gabaix, 2016).
There are several explicit and implicit contingent liabilities
through which governments are exposed to fiscal risks (Hochrainer-
Stigler, Keating, Handmer, & Ladds, 2018; Mitchell, Mechler, &
Peters, 2014; Schuler et al., 2019). Physical government assets and
public infrastructure may be damaged or destroyed. Governments
may hence have to spend on damage repair or reconstruction. Natural
disasters may also affect the assets or operations of state-owned
enterprises (SOEs). This could diminish the asset value of SOEs or
affect dividend payment to the government. Governments may also
have to realize contingent liabilities and step in and bail out SOEs that
have been hit hard by a disaster (see Bova, Ruiz-Arranz, Toscani, &
Ture, 2019). There are also fiscal consequences related to adaptation
and mitigation policies (e.g., Bachner, Bednar-Friedl, & Knittel, 2019).
The Global Commission on the Economy and Climate (2016) esti-
mates that globally until 2030, around US$ 90 trillion will have to be
spent on infrastructure, including energy, all of which needs to be
sustainable and climate resilient.
As regards to broader macroeconomic impacts of climate
change, the physical and transition impacts of climate change can
cause aggregate supply and demand shocks (Batten, Sowerbutts, &
Tanaka, 2016). Supply and demand shocks from extreme weather
events, although short-term in nature, can also have lasting impacts
on growth (Acevedo, 2014; Klomp & Valckx, 2014) and public
finances. Moreover, the supply and demand side effects of gradual
global warming and transition impacts can cause fundamental,
enduring structural changes to the economy. For many countries, cli-
mate change will have profound impacts on their long-run produc-
tive capacity and potential output. A country's long-term growth
potential will inevitably have ramifications for public finances,
including through effects on sovereign bond yields, and debt
sustainability.
Climate-related risks can also impact upon sovereign risk through
the negative effect on financial sector stability. Acute physical risks,
such as extreme weather events, and chronic physical risks, such as
worsening water stress or sea level rises, can result in direct damage
to operating assets and reduce the production output of borrowers.
The reduction in borrowers' operating margins and cash flows and the
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value of collateral assets can lead to credit downgrades, a higher prob-
ability of default, and a reduction in the secondary market value of
loans held on bank balance sheets. In more severe situations, bor-
rowers will not be able to meet their debt service obligations, resulting
in a higher incidence of nonperforming loans and a higher loss given
default due to the reduced value of collateral assets. Moreover, inves-
tors may suffer from stranded asset risk (Semieniuk, Campiglio,
Mercure, Volz, & Edwards, 2021). Financial sector instability may
require public bailouts that could affect the solvency of the govern-
ment and trigger a “doom loop,” where a worsening of the sovereign
risk profile and a decline in the prices of government bonds further
deteriorate banks' balance sheets.
The price of sovereign risk can also be affected by climate change
through the effect on international trade and capital flows
(e.g., Dellink, Hwang, Lanzi, & Chateau, 2017; UNCTAD, 2019;
Wilbanks et al., 2007; WTO and UNEP, 2009). The potentially signifi-
cant effects on countries' balance of payments positions, which are
important determinants of sovereign bond yields (e.g., Beirne &
Fratzscher, 2013), can have implications for sovereign risk. Impacts
can be grouped in three categories: disruptions to trade from climate-
related extreme events and disasters; long-term effects of global
warming on endowments and production; and transition impacts on
international trade.
Climate change can also exacerbate social tensions and resource
conflicts and thereby undermine political stability, which in turn can
detrimentally affect sovereign risk profiles. Notably, political instabil-
ity can undermine the ability or willingness of a government to repay
its debt. For instance, Clark (1997) emphasizes the potential impact
of political events on the probability of sovereign default, while
Cuadra and Sapriza (2008) maintain that countries that are politically
unstable and more polarized have higher default rates and are as a
result charged a higher default risk premium in international credit
markets.
3 | CLIMATE CHANGE IN
SOUTHEAST ASIA
Although the vulnerability to climate change varies significantly across
Southeast Asian countries, the region constitutes one of the most
climate-vulnerable regions in the world where economic impacts of
global warming are predicted to be among the largest (Kompas,
Pham, & Che, 2018; Yusuf & Francisco, 2009). In the widely used Cli-
mate Risk Index by Germanwatch, which ranks countries according to
fatalities and economic losses due to weather-related loss events, four
ASEAN countries—Myanmar, the Philippines, Viet Nam, and
Thailand—are listed among the 10 countries most affected by climate-
related disasters over the period 1999 to 2018, with Cambodia com-
ing close in 12th place (Table 1). At the same time, Brunei Darussalam
and Singapore rank among those countries with the fewest fatalities
and least damage. Figure 1 shows a significant increase in the absolute
number of extreme weather events in ASEAN since the start of the
last century. The increase has been driven by a rapid growth in the
number of floods, storms, and landslides.
Table 2 provides a breakdown of the average number of annual
fatalities, people affected, absolute losses, and losses as share of
GDP for the period 2000–2019, as well as the total number of
events over this period. The average total annual losses amounted
to 0.44% of GDP in Cambodia, 0.27% in the Lao PDR and Myanmar,
and 0.19% in Thailand. These averages, however, conceal the dam-
age that can be caused by single events. In 2008, Cyclone Nargis
caused economic damage totaling an estimated 12.6% of GDP in
Myanmar. The damages caused by the 2011 flood in Thailand are
estimated at 10.9% of GDP. Over the period 1993–2018, the
10 ASEAN countries and their combined population of 622 million
experienced direct economic losses from weather-related events
worth US$ 124 billion, which equates to an annual loss of US$ 5.2
billion (Table 3). Of these, only 14% were insured. However, this
TABLE 1 Climate Risk Index for 1999–2018










GDP in % 1999–2018 (rank)
175 Brunei Darussalam 169.17 168 154 179 180
12 Cambodia 35.33 40 34 52 26
77 Indonesia 76.83 16 92 21 120
76 Lao PDR 76.33 86 77 92 63
114 Malaysia 103.33 64 102 66 143
2 Myanmar 10.33 1 1 19 20
4 Philippines 17.67 7 16 9 29
180 Singapore 172.17 172 172 163 177
8 Thailand 31.00 22 62 4 18
6 Viet Nam 29.83 14 42 13 34
Note: The CRI score is calculated as a weighted average of the individual scores. For instance, with Viet Nam ranking 14th in fatalities among all countries,
42nd in fatalities per 100,000 inhabitants, 13th in losses, and 34th in losses per unit GDP, Viet Nam's CRI score is calculated as follows: 14x1/6 + 42x1/
3 + 13x1/6 + 34x1/3 = 29.83.
Source: Compiled with data from Germanwatch (Eckstein, Künzel, Schäfer, & Winges, 2019).
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figure is due to a relatively high insurance coverage in Thailand,
where 27% of losses were insured. In the Lao PDR, Myanmar, Viet
Nam, and Cambodia, hardly any losses were insured, while insurance
covered only 5% of losses in the Philippines, 8% in Indonesia, 11%
in Singapore, and 14% in Malaysia.
The expected annual fiscal burden arising as a consequence of
natural disasters (including recovery and reconstruction liabilities) as
a percentage of government expenditure has been estimated at
2.5% for Myanmar, 1.5% for the Philippines, 1.0% for Cambodia,
0.9% for the Lao PDR, 0.7% for Viet Nam, 0.3% for Indonesia, and
0.1% for Thailand and Malaysia (World Bank and GFDRR, 2012).
However, the estimated probable fiscal burden arising as a conse-
quence of a 1-in-200-year probable maximum economic loss event
as a percentage of annual government expenditure is significantly
F IGURE 1 Historical
occurrences of extreme weather
events in ASEAN, 1900–2019.
Source: Compiled with data from
EM-DAT (2020) [Colour figure
can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]






Total losses in million
US$ (average 2000–2019)
Total losses as




Cambodia 42 646,601 54.46 0.44 24
Indonesia 30 37,010 44.78 0.01 189
Lao PDR 14 177,989 22.85 0.27 20
Malaysia 4 65,377 30.19 0.01 47
Myanmar 3,489 158,644 104.62 0.27 40
Philippines 83 522,994 76.23 0.04 273
Thailand 31 941,647 574.33 0.19 82
Viet Nam 34 268,182 135.4 0.11 142
Note: No events were reported for Brunei Darussalam or Singapore between 2000 and 2019. Numbers for total deaths and people affected are rounded.
aThese numbers are not weighted by GDP/year but by the average of total losses in million US$ by the GDP average between 2000 and 2019.
Source: Compiled with data from EM-DAT (2020), WDI, and IMF.
TABLE 3 Losses from weather-related events, 1993–2018
Overall losses (2018 values in million US$) Insured losses (2018 values in US$) Fatalities
Brunei Darussalam 3.1 — 2
Cambodia 2,200 2.3 1,221
Indonesia 15,000 1,200 5,960
Lao PDR 460 — 188
Malaysia 2,300 330 974
Myanmar 5,500 — 143,070
Philippines 24,000 1,200 20,617
Singapore 42 4.4 2
Thailand 55,000 15,000 3,681
Viet Nam 19,600 43 9,247
Source: Compiled with data from NatCatSERVICE, https://natcatservice.munichre.com.
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higher: The World Bank and GFDRR (2012) estimate this at 23% for
the Lao PDR, 19.5% for the Philippines, 18% for Cambodia, 5% for
Viet Nam, 4% for Indonesia, and 1.5% for Malaysia and Thailand,
respectively. With global warming accelerating, the chances are that
disaster losses will rise further, unless investment in adaptation and
resilience is scaled up substantially, which would also increase direct
fiscal burdens.
Southeast Asian countries will not only be exposed to an increase
in the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events, but large
parts of the region will also suffer from chronic physical impacts such
as worsening heat and water stress and sea level rises, which are
expected to have a significant impact on economic activity. For
instance, as much as 7% of Viet Nam's agricultural land may be lost in
the case of a 1-m sea level rise (Dasgupta, Laplante, Meisner,
Wheeler, & Yan, 2009).
Estimations of climate change impacts on economic growth are
inexorably based on a host of assumptions on climatic trends, tipping
points, technological innovation, adaptive capacity, and the effects of
all these on human well-being and economic activity. Long-term
growth projections hence need to be taken cautiously. Nevertheless,
they do provide a useful indication of growth trends under different
climate scenarios. Most projections suggest that the economic cost of
inaction is immense. Raitzer et al. (2015) estimate that under a
business-as-usual scenario, Southeast Asian GDP will decline by 11%
by 2100. Table 4 displays recent country-by-country projections by
Kahn et al. (2019) on losses in GDP per capita by the years 2030,
2050, and 2100 under two different representative concentration
pathway (RCP) scenarios, RCP2.6 and RCP8.5. RCPs are greenhouse
gas concentration trajectories used by the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (IPCC). The RCP2.6 pathway is a relatively opti-
mistic scenario under which the increase of global warming is limited
to 0.01C per annum, in line with the Paris Agreement. RCP8.5 is
commonly referred to as the high emission or business-as-usual-sce-
nario. Under the RCP2.6-scenario, sea levels are projected to rise
between 29 and 59 cm, while the likely range under RCP8.5 would be
between 61 and 110 cm, relative to 1986–2005 (Oppenheimer
et al., 2019). Kahn et al.'s (2019:7) estimations suggest that the
world's real GDP per capita would be 7.22% lower in 2100 under
RCP8.5, compared to an output loss of 1.7% under RCP2.6. According
to Kahn et al.'s (2019) estimates, under RCP8.5, real GDP per capita
would be 8.46% lower in 2100 in the Philippines, 7.51% in Indonesia,
5.15% in Viet Nam, 4.12% in Malaysia, and 3.98% in Thailand.
Projections by Burke, Hsiang, and Miguel (2015) are even
bleaker (Table 5). Their estimates suggest that because of global
warming, global average incomes will be 23% lower in 2100 under a
RCP8.5 emissions scenario compared to a nonclimate change
scenario. According to their estimates, climate change will not only
hold back the economic growth of Southeast Asian countries but
even reverse their economic development in the second half of the
century.4
A low-carbon or even zero-carbon transition would inevitably
have to involve a phasing out of fossil fuels. This could cause
trouble for governments that currently rely to a high degree on
revenues from fossil fuels. Some governments rely heavily on
revenues from the extraction of oil, natural gas, and coal resources.
In Indonesia, revenues from fossil fuel accounted for 22.6% of
total government revenues in the period 2011–2016 (OECD,
World Bank, & UN Environment, 2018). A rough estimation for
Indonesia, for instance, suggests that the introduction of a US$75
per ton carbon tax (+1.8%/GDP), the loss of fossil fuel revenues
(−3.3%/GDP for 2011–2016), and the saving of fossil fuel sub-
sidies (0.7%/GDP in 2017) would worsen the fiscal balance by
0.8% of GDP.5
A decarbonization of the world economy would inexorably also affect
Southeast Asian countries' external trade. Figure 2 shows the carbon foot-
print of exports (t CO2e/US$) plotted against the exports of goods and
services as share of GDP for ASEAN countries as well as the OECD aver-
age for the year 2015. It clearly shows that the carbon intensity of exports
of ASEAN countries is much larger for all ASEAN countries, compared to
the OECD average. The exports of Viet Nam, Malaysia, Thailand, and Indo-
nesia have a particularly large carbon footprint. Moreover, the figure also
shows that most ASEAN economies are very export dependent. This
TABLE 4 Percentage loss in GDP per
capita in Southeast Asian countries by
2030, 2050, and 2100 under the RCP2.6
and RCP8.5 scenarios
RCP 2.6 scenario RCP 8.5 scenario
2030 2050 2100 2030 2050 2100
Brunei Darussalam −0.15 −0.07 1.41 0.16 0.50 1.65
Cambodia −0.36 −0.38 1.84 0.10 0.26 0.74
Indonesia 0.19 0.61 1.92 0.91 2.79 7.51
Lao PDR −0.09 −0.07 0.78 0.19 0.65 2.34
Malaysia −0.15 −0.31 −0.34 0.53 1.51 4.12
Myanmar −0.34 −0.61 0.25 0.29 0.80 2.24
Philippines 0.29 0.98 3.05 0.98 3.09 8.46
Thailand −0.03 −0.05 0.06 0.29 1.12 3.98
Viet Nam 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.38 1.51 5.15
Note: No data available for Singapore.
Source: Compiled with data from Kahn et al. (2019), Table A2).
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implies that they are facing large transition risks. For instance, carbon bor-
der tariffs, as they are currently being discussed in the European Union,
could have a significant impact on export revenue and domestic employ-
ment and by implication also on public finances.
Sources: Compiled with data from World Development Indicators
and OECD Statistics.
Note: Data on carbon footprint of exports were not available for
Myanmar and the Lao PDR.
To date, a comprehensive analysis of the potential fiscal impacts
of climate change in Southeast Asia is still lacking. Yet even this cur-
sory overview of macroeconomic climate impacts suggests that the
impacts on public finances and debt sustainability may be substantial.
It is important to understand the extent to which this is being
reflected in the pricing of sovereign debt.
4 | EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT
OF CLIMATE RISK ON SOVEREIGN BOND
YIELDS
4.1 | Previous research
While there is a rich body of literature analyzing the drivers of the
price of sovereign risk, studies have focused on macroeconomic fun-
damentals as well as international financial contagion. Only recently, a
new strand of the literature has emerged that tries to empirically
assess the link between climate change and sovereign risk. The first
study to systematically analyze the impact of climate change on the
cost of sovereign capital is Kling et al. (2018), who conducted a panel
analysis with annual data for a sample of 46 countries over the period























Brunei Darussalam 3.25 2044 41,737.88 126,684.7 −34.16 −81.47
Cambodia 3.60 2075 3,740.398 24,706.32 −38.94 −81.57
Indonesia 3.32 2067 8,841.082 38,561.36 −31.44 −77.93
Lao PDR 3.84 2069 3,567.634 17,327.95 −32.31 −79.17
Malaysia 3.41 2058 11,768.98 48,048.28 −33.53 −80.70
Myanmar 3.85 / / / / /
Philippines 3.05 2074 6,785.432 32,200.74 −30.61 −76.38
Singapore 3.23 / / / / /
Thailand 3.69 2058 8,341.051 40,265.12 −37.81 −84.70
Viet Nam 3.74 2066 3,593.551 17,668.67 −33.60 −80.82
Source: Compiled with data from Burke et al. (2015).
F IGURE 2 Carbon footprint
of exports (t CO2e/US$)
vs. exports of goods and services
as share of GDP (%) for ASEAN
countries and OECD in 2015
[Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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1996–2016. Accounting for a set of macroeconomic controls, their
results suggest that climate-vulnerable countries have to pay a risk
premium on their sovereign debt because of their climate vulnerabil-
ity, which is measured by indices from the Notre Dame Global Adap-
tation Initiative (ND-GAIN).6
Beirne et al. (2020) examine the relationship between the cost of
sovereign borrowing and climate-related risk using quarterly data for
40 advanced and emerging economies. Building on fixed effects panel
estimations on the effects of climate risk on bond yields, they employ
a structural panel VAR to examine the response of sovereign bond
yields to shocks to climate vulnerability and resilience. Their findings
show that both vulnerability and resilience to climate change are
important factors driving the cost of sovereign borrowing at the global
level. Their impulse response analysis from a set of panel structural
VAR models indicates that the reaction of bond yields to shocks
imposed on climate vulnerability and resilience become permanent
after around 12 quarters, with high-risk economies experiencing larger
permanent effects on yields than other country groups. Building on
Beirne et al. (2020), the purpose of the current article is to provide a
much more comprehensive and granular assessment of climate change
dynamics in Southeast Asia specifically, including at a country level.
Other related work includes that of Battiston and
Monasterolo (2019), who focus on transition risk. Using a financial
pricing model, they estimate the behavior of government bond yields
of OECD countries under forward-looking climate transition scenarios
aligned with the Paris Agreement. Their findings suggest that coun-
tries with a large exposure to carbon-intensive sectors face higher
bond yields. Klusak et al. (2021) model the impact of climate change
on sovereign credit ratings. Their findings suggest that climate change
adversely affects sovereign credit ratings, with likely impacts on the
sovereign cost of capital. Overall, the emerging literature suggests
that climate-related risks have an impact on sovereign yields. In the
following, we examine this relationship further through country-
specific analysis of ASEAN countries.
4.2 | Data and methodology
To empirically examine the effect of climate change on sovereign risk
in the ASEAN region, we estimate country-specific OLS models and a
fixed effects panel using monthly data over the period 2002M1 to
2018M12.7 The added value in the analysis undertaken relates to the
focus on six ASEAN economies that are particularly exposed to cli-
mate change. The country-specific models are estimated for the fol-
lowing ASEAN economies: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam, while the fixed effects panel
includes all six countries. This selection of ASEAN countries was
imposed by data availability. Our two baseline equations are as
follows:
Country-specific:
yt = γ0zt−1 + βxt−1 + χωt−1 + εt; t = 1,…,T ð1Þ
Fixed effects panel:
yi,t = γ0zi,t−1 + βxi,t−1 + χωt−1 + δi + εi,t; i = 1,…,N,t = 1,…,T ð2Þ
where yi is the sovereign bond yield; zi represents two climate change
indicators; xi denotes a set of domestic factors; ω denotes global fac-
tors; δi are country fixed effects; and εi is the error term. In order to
mitigate against endogeneity concerns, the variables are lagged by
one period.8 Clustered SEs are used in order to correct for residual
problems relating to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.
Following Beirne et al. (2020), the two climate change indicators of
interest comprise a measure of vulnerability to climate change and a
measure of resilience to climate change. The former is based on a refined
version of the ND-GAIN vulnerability index that was developed by Kling
et al. (2021), comprising 20 indicators for vulnerability of food and water
supply, health, ecosystems, habitat, and infrastructure (Table A2). It
excludes components from the original ND-GAIN index developed by
Chen et al. (2015) that are highly correlated with macroeconomic vari-
ables, so that this vulnerability index is less correlated with countries'
financial or economic conditions, which might cause endogeneity.9 For
resilience to climate change, we use a measure developed by FTSE Rus-
sell comprising 23 indicators for institutional, social, economic, and eco-
logical resilience to climate change (Table A3).10
For the domestic controls, we draw on the literature that examines
the drivers of sovereign bond yields (e.g., Beirne & Fratzscher, 2013;
Edwards, 1984). The vector of domestic factors in Equations (1) and (2)
includes the current account/GDP, public debt/GDP, fiscal balance/
GDP, GDP per capita, and GDP growth. In addition, to reflect more
highly integrated financial markets at the global level vis-à-vis ASEAN,
we also control for global factors. Specifically, we include US bond
yields and the Chicago Board Options Exchange's Volatility Index (VIX)
as a measure of global financial market volatility. Table A1 in
Appendix A presents details of all variables used, including the sources.
4.3 | Results
Table 6 presents both the country-specific and panel results.11 The
results are very clear in that greater vulnerability to climate change
appears to have a sizable positive effect on sovereign bond yields,
while greater resilience to climate change has an offsetting effect.
With the exception of the resilience coefficient in the case of the Phil-
ippines, which is also negative but statistically not significant at the
10% level, the country estimates are all significant, and most are
highly significant. Likewise, the panel results for ASEAN as a group
confirm that greater climate vulnerability raises the cost of sovereign
borrowing. Also, greater resilience to climate change lowers the cost
of sovereign borrowing. These results are in line with the findings of
Kling et al. (2018) and Beirne et al. (2020).
The control variables are largely in line with expectations. A higher
per capita income, more rapid GDP growth, and a stronger current
account correspond with lower bond yields. A higher public debt-to-
GDP ratio corresponds in most cases with a higher cost of debt,
although the coefficient is negative in the cases of Thailand and Viet
Nam. The results for fiscal balance are also mixed, which confirms the























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































8 BEIRNE ET AL.
notion that higher fiscal spending per se is not necessarily a problem
for the debt sustainability of countries. With regard to the international
control variables, higher US bond yields drive up the cost of sovereign
debt across Southeast Asia, with the exception of Viet Nam, where the
effect is statistically not significant. Last but not least, greater global
financial market volatility, as measured by the VIX, increases sovereign
bond yields in most cases, although the coefficients for Singapore,
Thailand, and Viet Nam are negative and significant for the latter two.
The significance of global risk aversion implies sensitivity in yields to
financial crisis and heightened uncertainty in global financial markets.
The relationship between bond yields and the VIX warrants some fur-
ther discussion. Previous work by Rey (2015) on the global financial
cycle notes that reductions in the VIX are strongly correlated with rises
in capital flows to emerging market economies, and one can infer that
the expected relationship between the VIX and bond yields in emerging
market economies should be positive (i.e., lower global risk aversion
leads to net bond inflows and a compression of yields). The direction of
the relationship between global risk aversion and sovereign bond yields
in emerging market economies lacks consensus in the empirical litera-
ture however. While the prior may be for a positive relationship,
Gadanecz, Miyajima, and Shu (2018) note that rising global risk aversion
can lead to declines in emerging market economy bond yields in multi-
variate models that incorporate domestic macroeconomic fundamen-
tals. Differences in the direction of the effect can also be related to
changes in the relationship across different phases of the business cycle
(Duyvesteyn & Martens, 2014). This can help to explain the negative sig-
nificant coefficients on the VIX in our bond yield equations for Thailand
and Viet Nam. Over the sample period in our analysis, global risk aversion
has reduced the cost of sovereign borrowing for Thailand and Viet Nam,
with these bond markets taking on the characteristics of safe havens
during periods of amplified global tensions, perhaps related to strong and
improving domestic fundamentals over the sample period.
When comparing the results across six ASEAN countries, it is
notable that the magnitude of the effect of vulnerability to climate
change on bond yields is highest for Viet Nam, the Philippines, Indo-
nesia, and Thailand. As discussed before, the Philippines, Viet Nam,
and Thailand are among the 10 most vulnerable countries in the
world. In particular, for Viet Nam, increased vulnerability to climate
change equates to a 728-basis point premium on its sovereign bond
yield. Interestingly, the effect has been the smallest in Malaysia,
whose coefficient estimate is even lower than that of Singapore, gen-
erally considered one of the least vulnerable countries.
The effect of resilience to climate change has a substantially
lower effect on bond yields across all ASEAN economies in our sam-
ple. The coefficients are negative and significant in all cases except for
the Philippines, where we find no significant effect. As in the case of
vulnerability, the highest effect is evident in the case of Viet Nam,
with higher resilience to climate change equating to a dampening
effect on bond yields of around 28 basis points. The effect of resil-
ience on the bond yields of the other ASEAN economies amounts to a
reduction in yields of less than 10 basis points.
Overall, the findings indicate that those countries that are particu-
larly exposed to climate change and have the greatest need for
resilience investment face the highest climate risk premium on their
sovereign borrowing costs. With climate change accelerating, and
both physical and transition impacts becoming ever more pronounced,
the risk is that climate risk premia are bound to increase further for
climate-vulnerable countries, undermining debt sustainability and con-
straining fiscal space for investment in much-needed adaptation and
resilience.
5 | CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION OF
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
This article is a first attempt at investigating the impact of climate vul-
nerability on public finances and sovereign risk in Southeast Asia, one
of the regions that is most affected by climate change. Using measures
for vulnerability and resilience to climate change, our econometric
analysis of six country-specific models as well as a panel regression
for all ASEAN countries in our sample reveal that greater vulnerability
to climate change has a sizable positive effect on sovereign bond
yields, suggesting that ASEAN countries are already having to pay a
climate-related risk premium on sovereign bonds now. With a worsen-
ing of climate change, and a greater awareness of investors to climate
change impacts, this risk premium is likely to increase in the future.
The implication is that countries like Viet Nam, the Philippines, Indo-
nesia, and Thailand, which are among those countries with the
greatest need for adaptation and resilience investment, will face
greater constraints in financing those. It should be noted that due to
data constraints, it was not possible to conduct this analysis for Cam-
bodia, the Lao PDR, or Myanmar, the poorest ASEAN countries.12
Cambodia and Myanmar in particular are both extremely climate vul-
nerable. For these countries, climate change poses a substantial threat
to future development.
There is a risk of a vicious circle facing climate-vulnerable countries,
where an acceleration of global climate change will make the developing
countries of Southeast Asia ever more vulnerable, with adverse effects
on their sovereign credit profile and a resulting higher cost of debt. A
higher cost of capital will, in turn, hold back public investment in growth
and development, including crucial investment in climate-resilient infra-
structure and other adaptation measures. Over time, there is a risk that
a worsening of climate change and associated macroeconomic impacts
will further undermine public finances. Moreover, greater climate vul-
nerability is also holding back the development of the private sector
(Kling et al., 2021). The poorer countries in the region face the risk of
not being able to finance necessary adaptation measures and, without
external support, ending up in this vicious circle of greater vulnerability
and worsening public finances and perpetual debt crises.
On the upside, we also find that greater resilience to climate
change can partially offset the effect of climate vulnerability on the
cost of capital. While the estimated effect of resilience to climate
change is substantially lower than that of vulnerability, the analysis
provides a very strong rationale for scaling up investment in climate
adaptation and resilience. However, with the exception of Brunei
Darussalam and Singapore, Southeast Asian countries will need
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international support to substantially scale up adaptation and resil-
ience investment.
Besides the need to enhance investment in resilience and adapta-
tion, our findings also underscore the need to mainstream climate risk
analysis in public financial management. Governments need to con-
sider the potential impacts of climate change on the medium- to long-
term quality and sustainability of public finances and seek to mitigate
risks. For instance, budget planning should build in fiscal buffers for
climate-related risks and develop contingency savings funds. The Phil-
ippines, for example, have established a National Disaster Risk Reduc-
tion and Management Fund, an example that could be replicated in
other countries in the region.
ASEAN countries should also seek to develop regional and interna-
tional disaster financing mechanisms and risk-pooling arrangements.
The establishment of the Southeast Asia Disaster Risk Insurance
Facility—a regional catastrophe risk insurance pool for the Lao PDR and
Myanmar—with financial support from Japan, Singapore, and the World
Bank in 2018 is a step in the right direction. However, a more ambitious
scheme for the whole of developing Southeast Asia will be needed.
ASEAN countries should also discuss with China, Japan, and the Repub-
lic of Korea—with whom they form the ASEAN+3 grouping—to man-
date the ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office to developing a
surveillance mechanism for climate-related macrofinancial risk for all
countries in the region (Volz, 2021). The ASEAN+3 group should also
consider to develop an emergency financing facility that would provide
support for countries hit by a disaster. Last but not least, ASEAN coun-
tries should also work with institutions like the Asian Development
Bank, the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank, and the World
Bank on strengthening adaptation and resilience across the region and
on developing risk transfer mechanisms.
Climate change poses a serious threat to development across South-
east Asia. Concerted efforts in adapting to climate change are needed to
reduce the vulnerability to, and impacts of, climate change. The amounts
needed to invest in adaptation and resilience will be substantial for all
countries of Southeast Asia. However, a failure to make these invest-
ments in the near future is likely to result in much greater costs in the
future—including in the form of a higher cost of sovereign borrowing.
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ENDNOTES
1 The 10 member countries of ASEAN are Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia,
Indonesia, the Lao People's Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), Malaysia,
Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam.
2 Klusak, Agarwala, Burke, Kraemer, and Mohaddes (2021) establish a
direct link between macroeconomic impacts of climate change and
sovereign credit ratings.
3 For further details on the transmission channels discussed in this sec-
tion, see Volz et al. (2020).
4 Projections by Kompas et al. (2018) paint a similarly bleak picture.
5 Estimates for carbon tax revenues and data on fossil fuel revenues are
from OECD, World Bank, and UN Environment (2018), while data on
fossil fuel subsidies are from the International Energy Agency's Energy
Subsidies database (2019).
6 In a related study, Kling, Volz, Murinde, and Ayas (2021) use firm-level
data and find that climate change vulnerability also affects the cost of
corporate financing and access to finance, controlling for various firm-
specific and macroeconomic factors.
7 The use of a fixed effects as opposed to a random effects model for
the panel has been justified on the basis of the results of a Hausman
test, which rejected the null hypothesis at below the 1% level with a
test statistic chi-squared value of 436.51.
8 Other approaches based on instrumental variables could have been
applied, although these are fraught with difficulty given the problems
of identifying suitable instruments. As regards preliminary analysis, a
correlation matrix of the independent variables indicates no concerns
about multicollinearity (see Table A4 in Appendix A). Furthermore,
stationarity tests based on the ADF test for the country-specific
models and the Choi (2001) test for the panel (which corrects for
cross-sectional dependence) reject the null hypothesis of a unit root
for the variables used in our analysis. Given the large volume of results,
these are not provided but are available from the authors upon
request. Descriptive statistics are provided in Table A5 in Appendix A,
while the dynamics of bond yields and our climate indicators over time
are shown in Figure A1 in Appendix A.
9 The original ND-GAIN vulnerability index comprises three core mea-
sures: (a) the extent to which an economy is exposed to significant cli-
mate change from a biophysical perspective; (b) the degree to which
an economy is dependent upon sectors that are particularly sensitive
to climate change; and (c) the extent of an economy's capacity to adapt
to climate change. This measure can be interpreted as an overall mea-
sure reflecting both physical and transition risks.
10 As can be seen from Tables A2 and A3, the component indicators of
the resilience and vulnerability measures overlap in only one compo-
nent, the freshwater withdrawal rate.
11 As shown in Figure A2 in Appendix A, the actual and fitted values from
the models indicate that the models explain the sovereign bond yields
of the ASEAN economies well.
12 There were also no data available for Brunei Darussalam, which, along
with Singapore, is one of the countries considered least climate vulner-
able (cf. Table 1).
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APPENDIX A
TABLE A1 Sources and definition of variables used in the empirical analysis
Variable Data source Definition
Sovereign bond yield Bloomberg 10-year government bond yield
Vulnerability ND-GAIN and Kling et al. (2021) The refined vulnerability measure by Kling et al. (2021) comprises all of the
components from the ND-GAIN vulnerability index that are not highly related to
economic variables.
Resilience FTSE Russell Resilience refers to a country's preparedness and actions to cope with climate change.
Current account/GDP OECD and CEIC The current account balance-to-GDP ratio.
GDP per capita The World Bank Real GDP per capita at constant 2010 US$.
Public debt/GDP IMF International Financial Statistics The public debt as a share of GDP, defined as general government gross debt-to-GDP
ratio.
Fiscal balance/GDP IMF International Financial Statistics The fiscal balance as a share of GDP, defined as cyclically adjusted primary balance-
to-GDP ratio.
GDP growth OECD and CEIC The real GDP growth rate.
US bond yield Bloomberg US 10-year government bond yield.
VIX Bloomberg VIX stands for the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE)'s Volatility Index, a
measure of global risk aversion.
TABLE A2 Components of Kling et al.'s (2021) climate
vulnerability measure
Sector Indicators
Food Projected change of cereal yields
Projected population change
Food import dependency
Water Projected change of annual runoff
Projected change of annual groundwater recharge
Freshwater withdrawal rate
Water dependency ratio
Health Projected change of deaths from climate-induced
diseases
Projected change in vector-borne diseases
Ecosystems Projected change of biome distribution
Projected change of marine biodiversity
Ecological footprint
Protected biome
Engagement in international environmental
conventions
Habitat Projected change of warm periods
Projected change of flood hazard
Infrastructure Projected change of hydropower generation capacity
Projected change of sea-level rise impacts
Dependency on imported energy
Population living less than 5 m above sea level
Source: Compiled by authors drawing from Kling et al. (2021).
TABLE A3 Components of FTSE Russell's resilience index
Sub-index Indicators
Institutional Intended country C02 emissions in 2030
Government effectiveness
Disaster preparedness index





People using sanitation services (% of population)
Access to electricity (% of population)





Country green bonds performance ratio
Water productivity
Agricultural adaptive capacity
Ecological Annual freshwater withdrawals
Share of protected areas
Share of biodiversity threatened
Biodiversity stock
Afforestation rate
Source: Compiled by authors using data from FTSE Russell.
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TABLE A4 Correlation matrix
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(1) Resilience 1.000
(2) Vulnerability 0.182 1.000
(3) Current account/GDP 0.496 0.158 1.000
(4) GDP per capita 0.641 0.151 0.785 1.000
(5) Public debt/GDP 0.531 0.550 0.661 0.728 1.000
(6) Fiscal balance/GDP −0.178 −0.006 −0.087 −0.032 0.058 1.000
(7) GDP growth −0.175 0.408 −0.249 −0.378 −0.106 −0.188 1.000
(8) US bond yield −0.171 0.004 0.012 −0.120 −0.008 0.210 0.125 1.000
(9) VIX 0.028 0.005 −0.064 −0.031 −0.008 −0.104 −0.127 −0.003 1.000
TABLE A5 Descriptive statistics
Variables Obs Mean SD Min Max
Sovereign bond yield 1,018 5.99 3.32 1.29 17.26
Vulnerability 1,152 48.05 3.74 41.78 53.40
Resilience 1,152 26.66 14.20 0 47.20
Current account/GDP 1,152 5.29 9.17 −22.73 31.75
GDP per capita 1,152 8.49 1.18 6.67 10.92
Public debt/GDP 1,152 107.38 45.47 45.38 221.62
Fiscal balance/GDP 1,152 −0.20 4.82 −13.19 9.74
GDP growth 1,152 6.49 3.97 −8.27 19.49
US bond yield 1,152 3.26 1.08 1.45 5.40
VIX 1,152 19.37 8.33 9.51 59.89
BEIRNE ET AL. 13
F IGURE A1 Sovereign bond yield and climate risk.
Note: The red line represents government bond yield in percentage. The blue line represents resilience. The green line represents vulnerability
[Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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F IGURE A2 Actual and fitted values of government bond yields.
Note: The red line represents the actual value of government bond yield in percentage. The dark blue dashed line represents its fitted value
[Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
BEIRNE ET AL. 15
